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The effects of fiscal institutions on budget deficits, the level and composition 
of government spending, and the level of government indebtedness are topics 
of active interest in both economics and political science. Much of the motiva- 
tion for ongoing research on these issues stems from the fiscal policy experi- 
ence of developed nations during the last two decades, particularly the rise of 
substantial peacetime budget deficits.  As policymakers have sought methods to 
reduce deficits and limit the growth of government debt, they have considered a 
range of possible changes in the institutional structure for fiscal policymaking. 
Because fiscal policy reforms are relatively rare at the national level, and be- 
cause such reforms are likely to be correlated with other changes that may 
affect fiscal policy outcomes, it is difficult to develop empirical evidence on 
the effects of such institutional changes. 
One alternative source of empirical evidence on the effects of budget rules 
involves comparisons of  fiscal policy outcomes across different subnational 
governments in a federal system. We  focus on the states within the United 
States. While states differ substantially in their incomes, tax bases, and levels 
of  spending as a share of personal income, they operate in a homogeneous 
legal environment and face many of the same fiscal pressures. They neverthe- 
less exhibit substantial disparities in their budgeting rules and fiscal policy in- 
stitutions. 
Studies of interstate differences in fiscal institutions and fiscal policy have 
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produced a growing body of evidence suggesting that fiscal institutions affect 
the size of state government, the incidence of fiscal deficits, and the level and 
composition of state borrowing. Rueben (1996) presents evidence of a negative 
correlation between tax and expenditure limits and state government spending 
as a fraction of state income. Alt and Lowry (1994), Bohn and Inman (1995), 
and Poterba (1994) document a negative correlation between state antideficit 
laws and the average size of state budget deficits. Bunche (1991), Eichengreen 
(1992), Kiewiet and Szakaly (1996), and von  Hagen  (1991,  1992) find that 
states  with  constitutional  restrictions  on  the  legislature’s  power  to  issue 
general-obligation debt issue less debt, and rely more heavily on revenue bonds 
and other  “off-budget’’ debt, than  states without  restrictions  on  debt issue. 
These studies and others, summarized by Alesina and Perotti (chap.  1 in this 
volume), Inman (1996), and Poterba (1997), cast doubt on the view that fiscal 
institutions are simply “veils” that voters see through, with no ultimate effects 
on fiscal outcomes, and they suggest that changes in fiscal institutions can have 
real effects on policy choices. 
Antideficit rules can affect measured deficits in two ways. First, they may 
lead to changes in the primary deficit because they constrain the actions, and 
the incentives, of fiscal policymakers. Second, they may affect the bond mar- 
ket’s perception of the borrowing jurisdiction, and thereby affect the required 
interest rate on outstanding debt. Proponents of antideficit rules argue that such 
rules should result in lower interest payments, as bond market participants de- 
mand a lower risk premium as compensation for potential default. 
While numerous studies have examined how  fiscal institutions affect pri- 
mary deficits, there is much less research  on how financial markets react to 
differences  in  fiscal rules. There  is a small  literature,  including  studies by 
Eichengreen (1992), Goldstein and Woglom (1992), Bayoumi, Goldstein, and 
Woglom (1995), and Lowry and Alt (1  997), on the correlation between fiscal 
institutions in the U.S. states and the interest rates on the bonds issued by these 
states. The present paper extends this research by examining a broader range 
of fiscal institutions, and by paying particular attention to the effect of tax and 
expenditure limits on borrowing costs. We also study bond market data for the 
1973-95  period,  a substantially longer sample than  earlier studies, and one 
that includes the state fiscal crisis of the early 1990s. 
The paper is divided into four sections. The first describes the conceptual 
model of bond market equilibrium that underlies our analysis and summarizes 
previous research on the link between fiscal institutions and borrowing costs. 
Section 8.2 describes the data on state-specific interest rates and state fiscal 
institutions that form the basis for this study, and it discusses a variety of issues 
surrounding  specification  and  estimation.  Section  8.3  presents  our  central 
findings on the link between fiscal rules and state borrowing costs. We present 
empirical results from a range of different regression models that explain the 
level of tax-exempt bond yields. Section 8.4 concludes, suggests several direc- 
tions for future work, and discusses the key tradeoffs that are involved in se- 
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8.1  Theoretical Framework and Previous Research 
This section summarizes the model of tax-exempt bond yield determination 
that underlies our empirical analysis. It also presents a brief review of previous 
studies that have investigated the link between fiscal institutions and interest 
rates, and places the current research in perspective. 
8.1.1  Theoretical Framework 
We  assume that the market for tax-exempt bonds clears by  equating the 
after-tax return that a “marginal investor” can earn on tax-exempt bonds with 
the after-tax, risk-adjusted return that is available on a riskless taxable bond. If 
Rr denotes the taxable yield, and R,,  denotes the tax-exempt yield on bonds 
issued by  state  i,  then asset market equilibrium requires that R,,i  equal the 
after-tax taxable yield, plus a risk premium: 
In this expression, T~~ denotes the marginal federal income tax rate on interest 
income for an investor in state i, B represents the aggregate stock of tax-exempt 
debt outstanding, B, denotes the outstanding debt stock for state i, and T~,,  de- 
notes the marginal state income tax rate on interest received by  residents of 
state i. By  including state taxes in this expression we  implicitly assume that 
the taxable bond is not aTreasury bond. The implicit assumption in this expres- 
sion is that tax-exempt debt issued by state i is held only by investors who live 
in state i.  There is usually a tax incentive for state residents to hold in-state 
tax-exempt bonds: many  states tax  out-of-state “tax exempt” interest, even 
though such interest is exempt from federal income taxation. While holding 
in-state debt may not be attractive from a portfolio diversification standpoint, 
we nevertheless assume that the tax benefits lead to such ownership patterns. 
The outstanding stock of debt in state i,  B,, affects equilibrium yields in two 
ways. First, the size of Bt can affect the state marginal tax rate of the “marginal 
investor” holding the bonds issued by  state i; we  assume that B, is not large 
enough to affect the marginalfederal income tax rate at which the tax-exempt 
bond market clears. This change in the state marginal tax rate can affect the 
riskless after-tax return that the marginal investor earns on taxable bonds, and 
therefore the required return on state i’s tax-exempt debt. In the simplest clien- 
tele models of capital market equilibrium, the first investor to hold tax-exempt 
bonds is the highest marginal tax rate investor, and an increase in the stock of 
tax-exempt debt outstanding leads progressively lower marginal tax rate inves- 
tors to purchase these securities. Formally, T:,~(B~)  < 0. The size of this effect 
depends on the degree of progressivity in the state income tax schedule. If the 
state has a flat-rate income tax, then ~f,  = 0. Even in these cases, changes in 
Bz  may still affect required returns through a risk premium effect. 
Second, the stock of outstanding debt can affect the risk premium demanded 
by  investors holding state i’s bonds. The second term in equation (l),  the risk 
premium on tax-exempt debt issued by  state $a,),  depends on Zt, a vector of 184  James M. Poterba and Kim Rueben 
state budget and tax institutions that affect the expected future supply of tax- 
exempt debt from state i and the probability of future payment of current inter- 
est obligations; X,, a set of state-specific economic factors, such as the unem- 
ployment rate, that affect the probability that the state will be able to repay its 
obligations; and Bi, the outstanding stock of debt issued by state i. Although 
state defaults  are rare,  they  have  occurred.  English  (1996)  and  Ratchford 
(1941) discuss U.S. state defaults  in the  nineteenth century in  some detail; 
most of these were  the result of aggressive state borrowing to develop un- 
profitable  canal systems in the  1830s and  1840s. The link between  the out- 
standing debt stock and the risk premium is straightforward:  for a given state 
economy, a larger debt burden corresponds to a greater risk of being unable to 
meet interest obligations. The link between economic conditions and the risk 
premium is also clear: for a given debt stock, the larger the economic base in 
the state, ceteris paribus, the lower the chance that the state will default. This 
is because a larger economy generates a larger tax base. 
Fiscal institutions (ZJ can affect the risk premium on state bonds for several 
reasons. Rules that make it more difficult for states to raise taxes increase the 
likelihood of future default on promised  interest payments. Antideficit  pro- 
visions in state constitutions and rules that limit the power of  the legislature 
to issue new debt may affect the future supply of state debt, and therefore alter 
the chance that the future supply of  debt will expand and drive down bond 
prices. 
While the stock of debt outstanding can affect a state’s risk premium, the 
stock of debt outstanding may also be affected by  the prevailing interest rate 
on the state’s bonds. Metcalf (1993) models the debt issue decisions of states, 
and finds that more debt is issued when interest rates are lower. Capeci (1994) 
presents a related empirical study of  debt yields and debt issuance decisions 
by local governments. The interactions between the debt stock and the interest 
rate complicate our empirical analysis. 
Most previous studies of fiscal rules and borrowing costs have included the 
outstanding  debt stock in equations  explaining the yields on state general- 
obligation bonds, but this leads to two problems.  First, the stock of debt is 
endogenous, which means it is difficult to interpret the estimated coefficient 
on this variable. Second, because some of the variation in the stock of outstand- 
ing debt may be due to differences in fiscal institutions across states, control- 
ling for interstate differences in debt outstanding may understate the potential 
effects of fiscal rules on borrowing costs. We estimate bond yield models with, 
and without, controls for the outstanding state debt stock as a way to investigate 
the importance of these effects. 
If we were prepared to assume that fiscal institutions did not affect the risk 
premium on state bonds, then indicator variables for the presence of these insti- 
tutions would provide instrumental variables that could be used to estimate a 
structural model of tax-exempt yield determination. The supply of debt from 
state i would depend on its fiscal institutions, but, without the risk premium 
effect, these institutions could be excluded from the demand equation for state 185  State Fiscal Institutions and the U.S. Municipal Bond Market 
i’s bonds. We could then estimate two-stage-least-squares  models for state bor- 
rowing rates as a function of debt stocks and state economic conditions, recog- 
nizing the endogeneity of the debt stock. The estimate of the coefficient on the 
stock of debt in such a debt demand equation, in conjunction with first-stage 
estimates of how fiscal institutions affect state borrowing, could then be used 
to estimate the effect of  fiscal institutions on state borrowing costs. Because 
we find statistical evidence against these identification assumptions, however, 
we pursue a reduced-form strategy in the estimation reported below. 
8.1.2  Previous Research 
There have been many previous studies of  yield determination in the tax- 
exempt bond market. Most of  these studies, which are surveyed in Fortune 
1996 and Poterba 1989, compare an index of yields on tax-exempt bonds with 
the yields on Treasury bonds. The emphasis is therefore on explaining the time 
series variation in the relative yields on taxable and tax-exempt bonds. Other 
studies have considered the impact of state-specific factors on state and local 
borrowing costs, typically using data on the net interest cost (NIC) of specific 
bond issues. Examples of  studies in this vein are Kidwell, Koch, and Stock 
1984 and Lovely and Wasylenko 1992. Both of these studies explore the rela- 
tionship between state income tax codes and state borrowing costs. 
The present study is closely related to a number of previous investigations 
of the relationship between fiscal institutions and the borrowing rates faced by 
U.S. state governments.  All of these studies analyze data from the Chubb Rela- 
tive Value Study, but they focus on different sample periods. These data are 
now available for the period 1973-96,  and we exploit the full data sample in 
our analysis. 
The first studies of fiscal institutions and general obligation bond yields, by 
Eichengreen (1992) and Goldstein and Woglom (1992), relate the interest rate 
on general-obligation debt to an index of the strictness of state antideficit pro- 
visions compiled by  the Advisory  Council on Intergovernmental Relations 
(ACIR). Eichengreen (1992) examines the relationship between interest rates 
and (i) an indicator variable for whether the state can carry a deficit from one 
year to the next, and (ii) the ACIR index. For the 1985-89 period, he finds that 
both  variables  are correlated with  the  interest rates  on  general-obligation 
bonds. His estimating equations do not include any controls for state economic 
conditions. Goldstein and Woglom (1992) study the 1982-90  period, and they 
also find evidence that the ACIR index of deficit limits matters. They estimate 
that states with the most restrictive set of fiscal limits face interest rates five 
basis points lower than states with “average” limits. 
The results in both of these studies are difficult to interpret because in addi- 
tion to control variables for the level of  state indebtedness and the observed 
state deficit, the regression specifications also include a measure of the rating 
on general obligation debt as reported by  Moody’s or another rating agency. 
Yet  the state’s credit rating, just like its borrowing cost, may  depend on its 
fiscal institutions. If  all of  the information about future fiscal conditions that 186  James M. Poterba and Kim Rueben 
was associated with the presence of a fiscal limit is incorporated in the state’s 
bond  rating,  and if  bond  ratings perfectly  predict  borrowing  costs,  then  it 
would be possible for the state’s borrowing rate to be uncorrelated with fiscal 
institutions, conditional on the state’s bond rating, even if changes in fiscal 
institutions have important effects on borrowing costs. Capeci (1991) discusses 
the role of credit ratings and economic conditions in determining tax-exempt 
interest rates. Controlling for the state’s bond rating in an interest rate equation 
can therefore mask the effect of the fiscal variables. 
The most sophisticated study  of  bond yields to  date is that by  Bayoumi, 
Goldstein, and Woglom (1995). They analyze interest rate data for the 198  1-90 
period,  and also conclude that fiscal institutions, as measured by  the ACIR 
index, affect state borrowing costs. This study recognizes the potential endo- 
geneity of the level of state debt, and it applies an instrumental variables strat- 
egy to estimate the effect of fiscal limits on borrowing costs. The instruments 
are a set of “year dummies,” a set of state-specific demographic variables, and 
the trend growth rate in state product. Each of  these variables could, under 
plausible modeling assumptions, be correlated with bond yields through chan- 
nels other than their effect on the endogenous variables, so the ultimate success 
of this empirical strategy is open to question. 
A final paper that explores the Chubb data, by Lowry and Alt (1997), is also 
concerned with the link between state fiscal institutions and interest costs. The 
novelty of this paper, however, is the investigation of how fiscal rules interact 
with economic conditions in determining  bond yields.  This study estimates 
statistical models in which the state’s borrowing cost depends on the current 
level of the state deficit, and the interaction of this deficit with the state’s fiscal 
rules. The key finding is that the bond market’s reaction to a state deficit de- 
pends on whether or not the state has a balanced-budget requirement. States 
with balanced-budget  rules experience  smaller increases in their borrowing 
costs for a given deficit, measured using data from the Census of Governments. 
Lowry and Alt’s  (1997) findings, which are based  on data for the  1973-90 
period, suggest that capital market participants consider the presence of anti- 
deficit rules, and their interplay with state economic conditions, in pricing state 
general-obligation bonds. 
The foregoing studies consider a limited range of fiscal institutions in ana- 
lyzing the determinants of tax-exempt bond yields. Virtually all of the studies 
consider the ACIR index of state fiscal stringency, which provides a general 
guide to state antideficit provisions. Yet this index suppresses substantial varia- 
tion in state fiscal rules.  Bohn and Inman (1995), for example, examine the 
fiscal impact of nine different indicators of state fiscal stringency in their study 
of  state deficit determination. They  find that a number of more  specialized 
variables,  such as requirements  for gubernatorial  submission of  a balanced 
budget, legislative passage of such a budget, and a referendum to approve new 
state debt issues, have distinct effects on budget outcomes. Their study sug- 
gests that it is possible to move beyond  a single summary statistic for state 187  State Fiscal Institutions and the U.S. Municipal Bond Market 
fiscal stringency, and the present study therefore explores a broader menu of 
fiscal institutions than previous bond market studies. 
The second important innovation in the current study is the use of the full 
data sample for the Chubb Relative Value Survey. Of the earlier investigations, 
only Lowry and Alt (1997) use data for the period before 1980, and none use 
data from the years since 1990. (This is not an indictment of  methodology: 
several of  the studies were completed before the post-1990 data were avail- 
able.) The pre-1980 and post-1990 data may, however, provide important evi- 
dence on fiscal institutions and borrowing costs, since both of these periods 
were times of extreme fiscal stress for states. The New York City fiscal crisis 
of  the mid-l970s, and the coincidence of  an economic downturn and rising 
state spending needs that led to the state “fiscal crisis” of the early 1990s, are 
included in our sample period. 
A final innovation is our consideration of the possible endogeneity of  state 
fiscal institutions. The potential endogeneity arises from the fact that these 
institutions are not fixed, but can be changed by voters and legislatures. Besley 
and Case (1994) have argued that many of the policy differences across states, 
and within states over time, that are treated as exogenous in empirical research 
are in fact reflections of underlying voter tastes or economic conditions. It is 
therefore possible that fiscal institutions are simply a reflection of voter prefer- 
ences, and as such, that the correlation between these institutions and fiscal 
policy outcomes just reflects an underlying correlation between voter tastes 
and fiscal policies. Rueben (1996) finds that the relationship between state fis- 
cal institutions and state spending depends critically upon whether these insti- 
tutions are treated as exogenous or endogenous. We address the potential endo- 
geneity of fiscal institutions, with limited success, in our empirical work below. 
To anticipate our findings, we do not find any potential instrumental variables 
with significant explanatory power for fiscal rules, that is, variables that gener- 
ate well-fitting “first stages” in a two-stage-least-squares setting. Treating the 
endogeneity of fiscal rules is therefore an issue that requires further work. 
8.2  Data and Estimation Strategy 
The estimation strategy we  pursue is largely determined by  the available 
data on state general-obligation bond yields. Our dependent variable, R,,  is the 
interest rate on 20-year general-obligation debt issued by state i as reported in 
the Chubb Insurance Company “Relative Value Survey.” This survey, which 
has been carried out every six months since 1973, asks 20-25  sell-side bond 
traders at major brokerage houses that deal in tax-exempt bonds to estimate 
the current yields on general obligation bonds from 40 states. The states ex- 
cluded from the sample-Arizona,  Arkansas, Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, 
Kansas, Nebraska, South Dakota, and Wyoming-are  concentrated in the Mid- 
west and Great Plains regions. The participants in the Chubb survey are asked 
to evaluate “hypothetical” general-obligation bonds that come due in 20 years, 188  James M. Poterba and Kim Rueben 
so reported differences in yields should not be attributable to differences in 
call provisions  or other factors, but simply to the perceived  riskiness of the 
state’s general obligation debt. Swartz (1989) discusses the responsiveness of 
these estimated yields to state economic circumstances, and notes that over the 
time period that the survey data has been collected, there has been some ten- 
dency for more rapid incorporation of  news into yield spreads. In particular, 
he claims that while changes in the Chubb values lagged changes in bond rat- 
ings in the early part of the  sample, they  often  led rating changes in more 
recent years. 
8.2.1  The Chubb Data and Model Specification 
The Chubb survey reports the relative yield on a general-obligation bond 
issued by  state  i, compared with a similar bond issued by New Jersey. This 
means that rather than estimating models for the level of the tax-exempt bond 
yields on bonds issued by state i, we are estimating models for the difference 
between the yields on the bonds issued by two states, R, -  R,,  where j  denotes 
New Jersey. To explore the implications of this, we can difference equations 
like (1) for two states, i and j,  and find 
(2)  RM,j - RM,j  =  [‘s,,(q)  - ‘,r,j(B/)IR,  +  uj(zc7  ’c)  - ?(‘j,  ‘j, ’1). 
Several terms involving the taxable bond yield, the federal marginal tax rate, 
and any other systematic factors such as the risk of  federal tax reform that 
affect the yields of all states in the same way, drop out of the expression when 
we difference the two state yields. 
To  translate this equation  into a form that we can estimate, we linearize 
equation (2), suppress the M subscript, and add a time subscript for the tax- 
exempt yields (hence RMj  becomes Rjr).  This yields 
(3) 
RLf  - Rjf = (Xil - Xp)*a + <Zlr - Zp)*P + (qr - B,r)*Y 
+ (‘,,,r  - ‘s,,,)*8 +  8,  +  (K, - Kj> + (qr - E;,). 
In this expression, R,,  denotes the nominal interest rate on bonds issued by state 
i at time t, Xt, denotes the set of state-specific economic and fiscal conditions 
that may affect borrowing costs, Z8,  represents the vector of  state budget and 
tax institutions that may affect the demand for state tax-exempt debt, B, de- 
notes the stock of state debt outstanding, and T,~,~~  denotes the top state income 
tax rate in state i in year t. In some specifications we omit the debt stock vari- 
able, for the reasons described above. 
The error term in equation (3) consists of three components: a time effect 8, 
that captures period-specific shifts in the relative risk premium for New Jersey 
(state j)  relative to all other states; the difference in two state-fixed effects, K~ 
and  K~,  which  captures the average difference between  state-specific factors 
that affect the borrowing cost for state i and New Jersey (statej); and E~~  -  E~~, 
which represents the difference in the state-specific error components at time 189  State Fiscal Institutions and the U.S.  Municipal Bond Market 
t. Because most of  the variation in  fiscal institutions is across states but not 
across time within states, allowing for state-fixed effects substantially reduces 
the sample variation in fiscal rules. One important consequence of  the data 
structure is that all of the independent variables need to be measured as devia- 
tions from the value for New Jersey. 
While the use of  survey methods rather than market prices to measure R,t 
raises questions about the reliability of the level of reported tax-exempt yields, 
our analysis focuses on differences in the yields on bonds for various states. 
Systematic errors in estimating the level of yields will therefore not contami- 
nate the analysis. Previous work using these data, notably Bayoumi, Goldstein, 
and Woglom (1995), suggests that the yield spread between the highest yield 
and the lowest yield states responds to economic conditions, and that in reces- 
sions, when default risk rises, the range of yields in the Chubb survey increases 
substantially. By  using the expanded data set we can also test how stable this 
relationship is over time. 
The variables that we include in the Xt, vector are the state unemployment 
rate, the level of  real per capita income in the state, and state general fund 
revenues as a fraction of  per capita income. State revenues are drawn from the 
U.S.  Department of Commerce State Government Finances publications; state 
unemployment rates, population, and per capita income are from the Data Re- 
sources @MARKETS data file. We  also include variables that proxy for the 
political climate in the state, on the grounds that such variables may provide 
information on the future evolution of state deficits. Our principal variable of 
this type is the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) score for the state’s 
Senate delegation; this should provide a general indication of the political ide- 
ology of the state. 
We  also include the highest state marginal income tax rate on interest in- 
come, as suggested by the equilibrium condition (1 >,  in our regression models. 
This variable is collected from a review of state income tax forms, augmented 
with information from the State Tax Module of the NBER TAXSIM program. 
We  lack detailed information on the state tax rates of  the investors who own 
tax-exempt bonds, so we assume that all such investors face the state’s highest 
marginal tax rate. 
8.2.2  Measuring State Fiscal Institutions 
We  consider a range of variables on state fiscal institutions, (Zt,}, that may 
affect state borrowing costs. Briffault (1996) provides a useful introduction to 
the budget processes of  the U.S. states. The first variable we consider is an 
index of state constitutional and legislative limits on deficit finance. This is the 
fiscal institution indicator that was analyzed in many of  the studies described 
above. There is substantial heterogeneity in state balanced-budget rules. Only 
one state, Vermont, does not have a formal balanced-budget requirement. The 
balanced-budget requirements in the 49 states with such requirements can be 
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Stringency  Restriction  Limit  Limit 
Budget  Debt  Spending  Revenue 
Washington  8  Yes 
West Virginia  10  Yes 
Wisconsin  6  Yes 
Wyoming  8  Yes 
1979 
Sources: Data on budget stringency rules and debt restrictions are from ACIR 1987 and Rafool 
1997. Data on revenue and expenditure limits are from Rueben 1996. 
"Requires a popular vote to approve debt issue. 
bPassed a nonbinding spending limit in 1977. 
'Adopted a nonbinding revenue limit in 1979. 
dPassed a nonbinding spending limit in 1979. 
'Spending  limit expired in 1983. 
'Nonbinding limit adopted in 1977. 
process at which balance is required. In 44 states, the governor must submit a 
balanced budget. This is the weakest of  the various balanced-budget require- 
ments. In 37 of  these states, the legislature must enact a balanced budget. 
These balanced-budget rules nevertheless allow for actual revenues and expen- 
ditures to diverge from balance if  realizations differ from expectations. In 6 
states, any unexpected deficit must be corrected in the next budget cycle. Fi- 
nally, in  24 of  the 37 states that require the passage of  a balanced budget, 
there is a prohibition on deficit carry-forward into the next budget cycle. This 
represents the strictest antideficit rule. 
Our data on balanced-budget rules are drawn from the Advisory Council on 
Intergovernmental Relations (hereafter ACIR)  (1987) report  on  institutions 
that promote fiscal discipline in the states, updated using subsequent issues of 
the ACIR publication Signijcant Features of  Fiscal Federalism. The ACIR 
index of budget stringency ranges between 0 (lax) and 10 (stringent). Table 8.1 
reports this index. We use an indicator variable for whether this index is below 
6 in our empirical work below. States with scores below 6 may have require- 
ments that the governor propose or that the legislature pass a balanced budget, 
but they do not have stricter rules. States that require a balanced budget at the 
end of the fiscal year score 9 or 10 on the ACIR scale, and states that require a 
balanced budget over a two-year cycle receive an ACIR score of  8. Only 14 
states receive ACIR scores of 6 or below. 
We  use the discrete indicator variable for the ACIR scores of 0 through 5, 
rather than the actual value of the ACIR score, because the latter imposes the 
same fiscal effect of  one-unit changes at different levels of the ACIR scale, 
even though these differentials may be noncomparable. The indicator variable 
that we use, which was also analyzed in Poterba 1994, captures the key varia- 192  James M. Poterba and Kim Rueben 
tion between states with lax and strict budgetary rules, but it downweights the 
small differences between states near either extreme. Our results are not sensi- 
tive to the cutoff that we use to define this indicator variable. In addition, while 
we focus on whether states have any restrictions on their budgetary outcome, 
we do explore the separate effects of these variables in some of our analysis 
below. 
While an overwhelming number of  states require budgets to be balanced 
during the current year, states in the Northeast and the upper Midwest are less 
likely  to have stringent antideficit  requirements. Many  of  the states outside 
those regions with less stringent budget rules, such as California, Nevada, and 
Louisiana, have more recently passed other fiscal constraints that restrict state 
revenue or expenditures. There is relatively  little change within our sample 
period in state balanced-budget requirements. 
The second fiscal institution that we consider is the ease with which the state 
can issue long-term general-obligation debt. The second column of  table 8.1 
lists the states that have some restriction on issuing general  obligation debt. 
Ten states have no restrictions on debt issuance; of the other 40,38 have consti- 
tutional restrictions on debt issue, and 2 have legislative limits. The most com- 
mon restriction places a dollar limit on the amount of debt outstanding. This 
limit varies from $50,000 in Rhode Island and Oregon to $3 million  in Ala- 
bama.  In ten  states-Arizona,  California,  Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, 
Missouri, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island-voters  can override 
the constitutional restrictions on debt levels to issue additional debt. In 3 other 
states, including New York, voters are required to approve any debt issue. In 
another 3 states, issuing debt requires a supermajority vote in the state legisla- 
ture. We define an indicator variable for all states with any type of debt restric- 
tion and include this indicator variable in our analysis below. 
Finally, we consider whether  a state has a state tax or expenditure  limit 
(TEL). These laws typically limit the growth rate of general fund expenditures 
or revenues to the growth rate of personal income, or to some function of that 
growth rate. Rueben (1996) controls for the endogeneity of TEL passage and 
finds that states with tax or expenditure limits have lower growth rates in gen- 
eral fund revenues  and expenditures. Shadbegian (1996), in a related  study, 
shows that the impact of TELs can depend on the nature of these limits, as well 
as state economic conditions, such as the growth rate of personal income. Our 
analysis relies on Rueben’s (1996) classification of “binding” state tax and ex- 
penditure  limits. “Binding”  limits are those  that cannot be overridden  by  a 
simple legislative majority. 
Most state limits on tax or expenditure growth were enacted during the “tax 
revolt”  of  the late 1970s, although some states have passed such legislation 
during the  1990s. Twenty-five states have instituted some form of limitation 
since 1976. The third and fourth columns of table 8.1 show the years in which 
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both tax and expenditure limits, and some states have enacted more than one 
tax or expenditure limit during the last three decades. A number of states have 
adopted nonbinding limits, and then adopted binding limits in later years. 
From the standpoint of the tax-exempt bond market, limitations on revenues 
and limitations on expenditures may have different effects. Limits on the tax- 
ing authority of the legislature may increase the risk that future interest pay- 
ments will not be covered by  tax receipts. Limits on expenditures, which in 
many  cases do not apply to interest outlays, are less likely to have adverse 
effects on the perceived riskiness of state bonds. If anything, expenditure limits 
may be perceived favorably by municipal bond participants, since such limits 
constrain the future expenditures that might compete with promised interest 
payouts. Thus we might expect that states with tax limits would face higher 
borrowing costs, while those with expenditure limits might face lower bor- 
rowing costs. 
8.2.3  Estimation Issues 
The primary estimation problem that we confront concerns the potential en- 
dogeneity of a state’s outstanding debt level. We estimate reduced-form models 
with, and without, the outstanding debt level to evaluate the effect of this vari- 
able on the other coefficient estimates. We  also instrument for current debt 
levels using a state’s historical constitutional debt restrictions on debt issued, 
and using information on how  difficult it is to change debt restrictions and 
other fiscal institutions. Unfortunately, these do not appear to be powerful in- 
strumental variables: they do not explain a substantial fraction of  the variation 
in state debt-to-income ratios. 
A related concern involves the potential endogeneity of  fiscal institutions 
themselves. There are two empirical strategies for addressing this endogeneity. 
The first involves controlling for some measure of voter preferences, such as 
the ADA score of  elected officials. This reduces the potential for observed 
correlations between budget rules and fiscal outcomes to simply reflect a corre- 
lation of both of these variables with an omitted third variable, voter tastes for 
fiscal outcomes. While this approach has been used in a number of empirical 
studies of  the relationship between fiscal rules and tax or expenditure out- 
comes, it has not been applied in studies of tax-exempt bond yields. The diffi- 
culty with this approach is that it is hard to find a set of control variables that 
completely capture the political tastes of state voters. 
A second approach to the endogeneity problem involves modeling the evolu- 
tion of budget rules and using variables that affect budget rules but not fiscal 
policy as instrumental variables in a simultaneous equations setting. This ap- 
proach was developed by  Rueben (1996). The difficulty with this approach is 
finding valid instruments that are correlated with the potentially endogenous 
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Table 8.2  Summary Statistics 
Variable  Sample Mean  New Jersey 
Interest rate on general-obligation bonds, relative 
Unemployment rate (percentage points) 
to New Jersey (basis points) 
Real per capita income (thousands of  1983 
Revenue/personal income 
dollars) 
State debt outstanding/personal income 
State marginal tax rate 
Lax antideficit rules (1 if ACIR < 6, 0 otherwise) 
Indicator for restrictions on debt issue 
Indicator for binding expenditure limit 
Indicator for binding revenue limit 
Indicator for legislature must pass balanced 
Indicator for requirement to correct deficit in 
Indicator for requirement to correct deficit in 
Indicator for requirement to correct deficit in 
budget 
next budget cycle 
current two-year cycle 























































Note: Sample means for the 1973-95 period, with standard deviations shown in parentheses. See 
text for further discussion. 
8.3  Empirical Findings 
We present summary statistics from our data set before presenting regres- 
sion results. Table 8.2 reports sample means for principal variables that we in- 
clude in our regression equations. The first column shows the sample mean for 
all states, and the second column shows the mean value for the state of New 
Jersey. The mean of the actual regression variables is the difference between 
the two columns. 
The average differential between the tax-exempt bond yield for New Jersey 
and all other states in the sample is just under 10 basis points. Although table 
8.2 does not show this, there are substantial interyear differences in the average 
value of this differential, presumably  as a result of changes in New Jersey’s 
fiscal situation relative to that of other states. The maximum annual value of 
this average spread was 21.7 basis points, in 1984, and the minimum was -7.9 
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tax-exempt bond yields. The year with the highest cross-sectional standard de- 
viation of yield spreads was  1975, when this measure was 40.7. This was at a 
time when New York  City’s fiscal difficulties were affecting the tax-exempt 
bond market. The lowest cross-sectional standard deviation was in 1994, 9.2, 
a time of robust economic growth in most states. 
Table 8.2 also presents summary information on other fiscal variables. The 
average state collects general fund revenue (total revenue less collections for 
state social insurance trusts) of  12.8 percent of personal income; this ratio is 
lower, 9.3 percent, for New Jersey. The average value of state debt as a share 
of state personal income is 8.6 percent, and New Jersey is very similar to the 
national average on this dimension. The ratio of  debt to personal income is 
typically less than 10 percent, but in some states in some years, the debt burden 
is substantially higher. Delaware, Rhode Island, and Alaska all have outstand- 
ing debt of  more than 25 percent of  personal income. The average state top 
marginal income tax rate is between 6 and 7 percent, compared with 3.5 per- 
cent in New Jersey. 
The bottom half of  table 8.2 presents summary statistics on the indicator 
variables for fiscal institutions, which correspond to the budget rules that were 
described in table 8.1. The indicator variables for the last four variables mea- 
sure different degrees of  fiscal discipline in correcting budget deficits. The 
weakest variable is the one for legislative passage of a balanced budget. States 
that require the next fiscal measure, correction of a deficit within the next year’s 
fiscal cycle, also require legislative passage of  a balanced budget each year. 
The strictest states are those that require deficits to be corrected in the current 
annual budget cycle. Some states have biennial budget cycles, and the second- 
to-last variable indicates that the deficit must be corrected within the current 
biennial cycle. 
Table 8.3 presents ordinary least squares (OLS) regression evidence on the 
association between fiscal rules, state fiscal conditions, and state borrowing 
rates. Each of the equations include control variables for the state unemploy- 
ment rate, the level of per capita income in the state, state revenues as a share 
of personal income, state debt outstanding as a fraction of personal income, 
the top state marginal tax rate on interest income, and the ADA score for the 
state’s senate delegation. The equation in the first column of  table 8.3 shows 
the effect of using only these control variables to explain the relative yields on 
tax-exempt bonds. The results indicate that yields rise with the state unemploy- 
ment rate and the level of  debt relative to income, and that yields are lower 
when state revenue represents a higher fraction of personal income. These re- 
sults also support the argument, developed in McKinnon 1997 and Bayoumi 
and Eichengreen 1994, that credit markets exert a disciplinary role on fiscal 
policy in the U.S. states. The coefficients on the other control variables are 
statistically indistinguishable from zero; this pattern persists in the other speci- 
fications that we  estimate. This set of  control variables can explain roughly 
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Table 8.3  State Fiscal Institutions and State Bond Yields 
Variable 
OLS  IV  OLS  OLS  OLS 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Unemployment rate 
Per capita income 
Revenuetincome 
Debuincome 
State marginal tax 
Average ADA score 
Lax antideficit rules 
rate 








Correct deficit next 
cycle 
Correct deficit this 
two-year cycle 


























































































-  10.25 
Note: Data are for 1973-95  for the 40 states covered in the Chubb Relative Value Survey and 
include 899 observations. Annual indicator variables are included in each regression, and all vari- 
ables reported are differenced from the New Jersey value. Standard errors, which are in parenthe- 
ses, control for across-state heterogeneity and within-state correlation. The state debt-to-income 
ratio is treated as endogenous in the equation reported in column 2, and state fiscal institutions are 
used as instrumental variables for this estimation. 
One noteworthy but statistically insignificant coefficient is that on the state 
political ideology variable, the ADA score. This variable has a positive coeffi- 
cient, implying that more liberal states pay  more to borrow, but we  cannot 
reject, at standard significance levels, the null hypothesis that this coefficient 
equals zero. This suggests that the omitted variable problems associated with 
failure to include a detailed set of variables capturing state political taste may 
not be critical. 
The equation in the second column of table 8.3 includes the same explana- 
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to-income ratio as an endogenous variable. We use the set of fiscal institutions, 
the variables in (ZJ,  as the set of excluded exogenous variables in the estima- 
tion. When the debt-to-income ratio is treated as endogenous, its coefficient 
doubles, but the standard error rises by  a factor of  five, and we  would not 
reject the null hypothesis that the debt-to-income coefficients in the OLS and 
instrumental variables (IV) specifications are the same. The other coefficients 
also change between the two specifications, but given their large standard er- 
rors, it is again difficult to draw firm conclusions. We  tested, and rejected, the 
null hypothesis that fiscal institutions only affect bond  yields through their 
effect on the level of outstanding debt. The results therefore suggest that fiscal 
institutions do not provide a suitable set of instrumental variables for the debt- 
to-income ratio because they also affect bond yields directly. 
The equation shown in the third column of  table 8.3 returns to the OLS 
strategy of  the first column, but it includes the indicator for lax fiscal rules 
along with the foregoing control variables. The results suggest that tighter anti- 
deficit rules are associated with lower borrowing rates. A state with weak anti- 
deficit rules, all else equal, faces a borrowing rate 13 basis points higher than 
a state with tough antideficit rules. This finding confirms the results in earlier 
studies using the Chubb data. This effect does not change significantly (it de- 
creases by  1 basis point) if we redefine the lax antideficit rules to include states 
that can carry over a deficit but must correct it in the next budget cycle, that is, 
with ACIR scores of 0 through 6 rather than 0 through 5. 
The equation in the fourth column of table 8.3 includes the indicator variable 
for antideficit rules as well as three additional variables: one for the presence 
of  a debt limit, and two variables corresponding to binding expenditure and 
revenue limits. Adding these variables reduces the statistical significance of 
the coefficient on the antideficit rule variable, although this coefficient remains 
positive and greater than its standard error. The debt limit variable has a nega- 
tive coefficient, consistent with the discussion above, but the coefficient is not 
statistically significantly different from zero. The expenditure limit variable 
has a negative and statistically significant effect on yields: states with binding 
expenditure limits face borrowing costs that average 7 basis points less than 
states without such limits. The presence of a binding revenue limit has a large 
and statistically significant positive effect on yields: the presence of  such a 
limit raises a state’s borrowing cost by  almost 18 basis points. This finding 
represents an effect of fiscal institutions that has not been documented in previ- 
ous work, and it suggests that bond market participants view revenue limits as 
institutions that raise the risk of default. 
The equation in the last column of table 8.3 does not include the antideficit 
indicator variable. Instead, it includes a set of indicator variables for different 
degrees of stringency in the budget process. The omitted category in this equa- 
tion is the set of  states that have  no balanced-budget rules (Vermont) or the 
relatively weak requirement that the governor submit a balanced budget (New 
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states that only require their legislatures to pass a balanced budget. In these 
states bond yields are lower, by an average of  10 basis points, than in states 
where the only requirement is that the governor submit a balanced budget. This 
effect is statistically indistinguishable from zero, however. 
The next three variables are indicator variables for progressively more strin- 
gent rules that require deficits to be corrected in specified time frames. States 
that require that deficits be corrected by the end of the next budget cycle also 
have lower borrowing costs than states with only gubernatorial submission re- 
quirements, but again, the effect is statistically indistinguishable from zero. 
States with the strictest requirements,  namely  the rule that deficits  must be 
corrected within the current fiscal year, have borrowing costs that average 17 
basis points below the costs of states in which governors are required to submit 
balanced budgets. This effect is statistically significant at standard confidence 
levels, and it suggests that much  of the power of  the “lax antideficit rules” 
variable is coming from the difference in borrowing costs in states with very 
strict, and all other, antideficit rules. When the expanded set of fiscal institution 
indicators is included in the regression specification, the explanatory power of 
the equation rises. The adjusted R2 for the equation in the last column of table 
8.3 is .46, compared with .44 for the equation in the penultimate column that 
excludes the detailed indicator variables on antideficit rules. 
The equations reported in table 8.4 explore the possibility that the effect of 
fiscal institutions on borrowing costs is blunted by the inclusion of  the debt- 
to-income ratio in the specifications shown in table 8.3. The equation shown 
in the first column illustrates the changes in the control variable coefficients 
when the debt-to-income ratio is deleted. The coefficient on the unemployment 
rate remains positive and statistically significant, but per capita income, which 
was insignificantly different from zero in the specifications shown in table 8.3, 
now becomes statistically significant and positive. Revenue as a percentage of 
income, which was negative in table 8.3, switches signs and becomes positive 
in table 8.4. The ADA score and the top marginal tax rate are statistically insig- 
nificantly different from zero in most of the estimates in table 8.4, as they were 
in table 8.3. 
The sign pattern  and the statistical significance of the coefficients on the 
fiscal institution variables  is largely unaffected by  exclusion  of  the debt-to- 
income ratio. This can be seen by comparing the coefficients in table 8.3 with 
those in table 8.4. The point estimate on the antideficit rule variable (column 
2) rises slightly when the debt-to-income ratio is dropped from the specifica- 
tion. This is consistent with the notion that tight fiscal rules lower the value of 
the debt-to-income ratio, and that including this ratio in the estimating equa- 
tion therefore captures some of the effect of these variables. 
The equation shown in the third column of table 8.4 models the indicator of 
lax fiscal rules,  the ACIR  variable,  as endogenous. This corresponds to our 
earlier discussion of the potential endogeneity of fiscal rules. The difficulty in 
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Table 8.4  State Fiscal Institutions and State Bond Yields Excluding Outstanding State 
Debt Stock 
OLS  OLS  IV  OLS  IV  OLS 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Unemployment rate 
Per capita income 
RevenueJincome 
State marginal tax 
Average ADA 
Lax antideficit 








Correct deficit next 
cycle 
Correct deficit this 
two-year cycle 





























































596.6  609.6 
(123.8)  (80.8) 
0.35  1.02 
(3.98)  (0.96) 
60.2  43.8 
(78.4)  (23.3) 
68.3  40.4 
(46.9)  (43.0) 
2.76  8.58 
(10.68)  (5.77) 
7.14 
(43.92) 
(28.74)  (4.88) 
4.82  -3.96 
(44.62)  (3.83) 
21.76  12.26 
(52.96)  (6.56) 
-  12.50 
(8.18) 






-26.78  -8.03 
-11.13 
Note; Data are for 1973-95  for the 40 states covered in the Chubb Relative Value Survey and include 899 
observations. Annual indicator variables are included in each regression, and all variables reported are 
differenced from the New Jersey value. Standard errors, which are shown in parentheses, control for 
across-state heterogeneity and within-state correlation. The endogenous variable in column 3 is the indica- 
tor for lax antideficit rules, and in column 5,  all of the variables related to fiscal institutions are treated as 
endogenous. See text for further discussion of the excluded exogenous variables. 
nous variables are available for use as instrumental variables. Such variables 
need to be correlated with current fiscal rules, but uncorrelated with the error 
term in equation (3). 
The instrumental variables that we consider are related to the current or his- 
torical structure of  the state political process. They involve constitutional or 
legal provisions that would make it more or less difficult to adopt fiscal rules, 
such as tax and expenditure limits or restrictions on state deficits. The five 
instrumental variables that we use are whether the state constitution permits 
statewide referenda to enact legislation (so-called direct-legislation states), 
whether voters can recall elected officials, whether the initial state constitution 200  James M. Poterba and Kim Rueben 
included limits on debt issuance, the “signature requirement” (the fraction of 
the state’s voters that must sign a petition in order to place a policy proposal 
on a statewide ballot for referendum vote), and the year a territory became a 
state. It is sometimes argued, and the empirical evidence in Matsusaka (1995) 
suggests, that grassroots campaigns lead to support among voters for tax and 
expenditure limits, but that such support is much more difficult to generate in 
elected legislatures. If this is the case, then the direct legislation variable and 
the  “signature requirement”  should affect the chances  of enacting  a tax or 
spending limit. Similarly, one can argue that recall provisions increase the de- 
gree to which elected officials are responsive to voter preferences, and thereby 
affect the probability that legislatures will enact deficit limits, or tax or expen- 
diture limits, conditional on a level of voter support for such measures. Mag- 
leby (  1984) provides  valuable  background  on the political consequences  of 
various methods of implementing “direct democracy.” The historical debt limit 
variable is largely determined by when the state was founded, since, as English 
(1996) explains, states whose constitutions were written  after the state debt 
defaults of the 1830s and 1840s were more likely to place limits on debt. Fi- 
nally, the year a state constitution was adopted is another way to pick up idio- 
syncracies in state constitutions that will affect the ease of adopting different 
fiscal institutions. 
The estimates in the third column of table 8.4 are discouraging. While the 
IV estimates still yield a positive effect of weak antideficit rules on borrowing 
costs, the standard error of the coefficient estimate (28.42) is so large that a 95 
percent confidence interval  includes both  the OLS estimate  and a range of 
other values. The instrumental variables are “weak” in the sense that we find 
very imprecise estimates of the coefficient of interest; our instruments do not 
explain much  of  the  variation  in  antideficit  rules,  even  though,  as Rueben 
(1996) finds, they do explain a substantial fraction of the variation in tax and 
expenditure limits. 
Returning to OLS results that are similar to those in table 8.3, but that ex- 
clude the debt-to-income ratio from the specification, we find that the effect of 
a binding revenue limit, shown in table 8.4 column 4, is slightly reduced when 
we exclude the debt-to-income ratio from the specification. Column 4 presents 
OLS estimates including the variables for lax deficit rules, debt limits, revenue 
limits, and expenditure limits. The coefficients are broadly similar to those in 
table 8.3, where the debt-to-income ratio was included in the specification. The 
fifth column of table 8.4 presents an equation that treats all four of these fiscal 
institutions as endogenous. Just as with the IV estimates described above, how- 
ever, the standard errors on all of the estimated coefficients rise substantially. 
It is not possible to draw any strong inferences from the IV estimates, except 
that the set of instruments that we have used has low power. Indeed, in first- 
stage regression equations relating the fiscal institutions to the instrument set, 
the only endogenous variable that the instruments are jointly statistically sig- 
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The last column in table 8.4 shows another OLS equation, in this case esti- 
mated with the exhaustive set of fiscal institutional variables. There is no clear 
pattern of changes in the set of coefficients when compared with those in table 
8.3. The estimated effect of the requirement that a deficit be corrected in the 
current annual budget cycle is larger than in the comparable equation in table 
8.3 that included the debt-to-income ratio, but not by a large amount relative 
to the coefficient standard error. In general, the findings in table 8.4 do not 
suggest that the inclusion of the debt-to-income ratio has substantially altered 
the previous findings with regard to the impact of fiscal rules on borrowing 
rates. 
The results from our basic specifications suggest that fiscal institutions af- 
fect state borrowing costs, and they provide new information on the types of 
fiscal rules that have the greatest impact. We now consider whether the impact 
of  these fiscal rules depends on state economic conditions, as measured by 
the state unemployment rate. We do this by interacting three fiscal rules-the 
indicator for lax antideficit rules, and the indicators for tax and expenditure 
limits-with  the state unemployment rate. This approach is related to Lowry 
and Alt’s (1997) interaction of the state deficit with fiscal rules. 
Table 8.5 presents the results of our unemployment-interaction  analysis. The 
equation in the first column includes only the variable for lax antideficit rules, 
and this variable interacted with the unemployment rate. The effect of lax bud- 
get rules is not significantly affected by  state economic conditions. We  find 
similar results with respect to limits on the state legislature’s authority to issue 
debt, as the results in the second column suggest. However, the equation in the 
second column also interacts the indicator variables for the presence of revenue 
and expenditure limits with the unemployment rate. While there is weak evi- 
dence that the effect of expenditure limits is accentuated in states with higher 
unemployment rates, there is a statistically significant, and substantively im- 
portant, interaction effect between revenue limits and the state unemployment 
rate. 
To  illustrate this effect, contrast two states, one without a binding revenue 
limit, and one with such a limit. On average, the state without the revenue limit 
will face borrowing costs 10 basis points lower than the state with the revenue 
limit. Now consider a two-percentage-point increase in the unemployment rate 
in the two states. The estimates in table 8.5 suggest that there will be a 10- 
basis-point increase in the yield spread between the tax-exempt bonds issued 
by the two states. For each percentage point that the unemployment rate rises 
in a state with a binding revenue limit, the state bond yield rises by  5 basis 
points relative to the yield of a similar state without a revenue limit. This sug- 
gests that when state economic conditions deteriorate, revenue limits become 
a greater concern for bond market participants. 
The data sample that we analyze is longer than that in previous studies of 
fiscal rules and borrowing costs. One advantage of this long sample is that we 
can examine whether the relationships described above are stable over time. 202  James M. Poterba and Kim Rueben 
Table 8.5  State Fiscal Rules, Economic Conditions, and Bond Yields 
Explanatory Variable  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Unemployment rate  587.79  491.57  497.61 
Per capita income  1.54  1.33  1.32 
Revenuehncome  32.06  52.82  -40.20 
State marginal tax rate  65.51  77.75  52.37 
(104.64)  (1  85.89)  (88.22) 
(0.81)  (0.66)  (0.66) 
(24.20)  (19.84)  (24.00) 
(47.35)  (41.30)  (20.12) 
Average ADA score  8.78  4.96  4.78 
(5.74)  (5.63)  (5.55) 
Lax antideficit rules  15.56  12.90  12.74 
(5.04)  (6.99)  (6.90) 
Lax antideficit rules*unemployment  57.26  68.00 
(132.47)  (197.89) 
Limit on issuing debt  -4.95  -5.00 
(5.69)  (5.52) 
Limit on issuing debt*unemployment 
Binding expenditure limit 
Binding expenditure 















,373  ,427 
-4.62 
(3.91) 







Note: Data are for 1973-95  for the 40 states covered in the Chubb Relative Value Survey and 
include 899 observations. Annual indicator variables are included in each regression, and all vari- 
ables are differences from the New Jersey value. Standard errors, which are shown in parentheses, 
control for across-state heterogeneity and within-state correlation. 
Table 8.6 presents four regression equations that address this issue. The equa- 
tions in columns l and 2 correspond to column 2 in table 8.4, but the equation 
is estimated first for the 1973-89  sample period, and again for 1990-95.  While 
the coefficients on several of  the control variables differ across the sample 
periods, with a lower coefficient on the unemployment rate in the most recent 
subsample, for example, the coefficient on the indicator variable for lax anti- 
deficit rules does not change substantially across samples. An  F-test of  the 
hypothesis that all coefficients are the same in two sample periods would nev- 
ertheless reject the null of parameter constancy. 
The third and fourth columns of table 8.6 present subsample estimates for 
the expanded equation, including revenue and expenditure limits. The results 
suggest one interesting pattern: the effect of  binding revenue limits on state 
borrowing costs appears to be larger in the 1973-89  period than in more recent 203  State Fiscal Institutions and the U.S. Municipal Bond Market 
Table 8.6  State Fiscal Rules and Bond Yields: Are the 1990s Different? 
1973-89  1990-95  1973-89  1990-95 
Explanatory Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Unemployment rate 
Per capita income 
Revenuelincome 
State marginal tax rate 
Average ADA score 
Lax antideficit rules 
Limit on issuing debt 
Binding expenditure limit 


































































Note:  Data are for 1973-95  for the 40 states covered in the Chubb Relative Value Survey and 
include 899 observations. Annual indicator variables are included in each regression, and all vari- 
ables are differences from the New Jersey value. Standard errors, which are shown in parentheses, 
control for across-state heterogeneity and within-state correlation. Regressions for 1973-89  in- 
clude 680 observations, while those for 1990-95  have 219 observations. The F-statistic for equal 
coefficients in columns 1 and 2 is F(9,858) = 7.42, and F(11,852) = 6.26 for columns 3 and 4, 
so we reject the null of  constant coefficients across the two the  periods. 
years. When we  constrain the coefficients on the variables other than fiscal 
institutions to be the same for the entire sample, but interact the fiscal institu- 
tion variables with a post-1990 dummy variable, the same findings emerge. 
The coefficient on the post-1990 dummy interacted with the indicator for a 
binding revenue limit is -23.2  (8.14), which suggests a much larger effect of 
this variable in the earlier part of the sample. The interpretation of this result 
is unclear. It may  be that as more states have  adopted revenue limits, bond 
market participants have become less concerned about the negative effect of 
these limits on state capacity to service debt. The rise of municipal bond insur- 
ance may also be a factor. This is an issue that requires further study. 
In addition to the pre- and post-1990 sample divisions, we also explored the 
sensitivity of our findings to estimation on the “pre-New  York City fiscal cri- 
sis” sample. We  interacted an indicator variable for the pre-1975 period with 
our standard list of fiscal institutions. The results, which must be viewed with 
caution in light of the short sample period, suggest that the positive effect of 
debt restrictions on yields was greater in the years before 1975 than afterward, 
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period than subsequently. The effect of revenue and expenditure limits cannot 
be estimated for the pre-1975 period-there  were no such limits. These results 
provide some support for the notion that bond market participants have become 
more interested in the role of fiscal institutions in the years since the New York 
City fiscal problem. 
8.4  Conclusion and Future Directions 
Our principal finding is that state fiscal institutions affect the required return 
that lenders demand when states enter the market for tax-exempt bonds. The 
effects that we uncover are substantively as well as statistically significant. A 
state with a binding tax limitation statute will face, on average, a borrowing 
rate between 15 and 20 basis points higher than a state without a tax limitation 
law. With long-term tax-exempt bond rates averaging something like five per- 
centage points, borrowing cost differentials of this magnitude are not trivial. A 
state with an expenditure limitation law, in contrast, will face a borrowing rate 
that is several basis points lower than that of a state without any fiscal limits. 
Lenders appear to demand higher yields from states with tax limitation laws, 
presumably because such restrictions may make it difficult to raise taxes to pay 
interest in the future, while they appear to view spending limitation laws as 
favorable indicators of the state’s future fiscal soundness. 
We also confirm, with a longer data sample and somewhat more inclusive 
empirical model, previous findings that antideficit provisions in the state con- 
stitution have an important effect on borrowing costs. Those states with weak 
antideficit provisions face borrowing costs 10 to  15 basis points higher than 
similar states with stricter antideficit rules. Restrictions on state authority to 
issue long-term general-obligation debt are associated with lower borrowing 
costs, although the point estimates suggest weaker effects for these institutions 
than for some of the other fiscal rules considered above. 
Our focus on the capital market as a way of obtaining evidence on the effects 
of fiscal institutions could be extended in several directions. One possibility 
would be to move beyond the use of interest rate differentials to analyze other 
market-based measures of state default risk. Studying how default insurance 
rates charged by municipal bond insurers are influenced by fiscal institutions 
would be one possible extension. This project would require detailed informa- 
tion on default insurance rates for state general obligation bonds, ideally at 
several different points in time. Our analysis could also be extended to the case 
of local rather than state governments. Hirsch’s (1991) study of the net interest 
costs on California municipal bonds around the enactment of  Proposition 13 
provides some evidence that local bond yields are affected by changes in fiscal 
institutions. Yet  another extension would focus on the short-run yield adjust- 
ments to economic news, and the effect of fiscal institutions on such adjust- 
ments.  One could consider how unexpected state deficits that arise within a 
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deficit policies. Research of this type could complement the evidence in Po- 
terba (1994) on the relationship between antideficit rules and short-run state 
fiscal adjustment. 
Our results raise unanswered questions about why different states choose 
different fiscal institutions, and what trade-offs are involved in choosing one 
set of institutions or another. Research is just beginning on the general question 
of what the optimal fiscal constitution consists of; see Roubini 1995 for a dis- 
cussion of these issues. With respect to state antideficit rules, there is a small, 
and as yet inconclusive, literature on how different fiscal rules affect state eco- 
nomic performance. Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1995) and Levinson (1997) 
find that states with more restrictive fiscal constitutions have  higher output 
volatility, apparently as a result of  less fiscal flexibility on the part of  state 
government, while Alesina and Bayoumi (1996) do not find any evidence link- 
ing the stringency of state fiscal rules to the variability of state economic activ- 
ity. With respect to tax and expenditure limits, there is evidence, for example 
Rueben 1996, that these rules affect the size of  government in the state econ- 
omy. These rules also have effects on state borrowing costs. These studies illus- 
trate the type of research that is needed to identify the net benefits of different 
fiscal rules. Our findings suggest that voters in states that enact tighter fiscal 
rules benefit from lower borrowing costs; the  unresolved question is what 
countervailing costs, or additional as-yet-unquantified benefits,  these fiscal 
rules also produce. 
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